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 I was asked to present on US perspectives on China’s rise and its cultural 
implications on US-ROK relations. Forgive me for altering the assignment somewhat. In 
this paper, I reflect on the political implications of trends in cultural relations between the 
US and South Korea based on the contrast with trends in the cultural, versus political, 
relationship between the US and China. My argument, in essence, is that the cultural base 
of Sino-American relations is broadening and diversifying—even as USA-PRC relations 
go up and down. The cultural base of South Korea-America relations is, conversely, 
narrowing down to the USA-ROK security alliance, which seems good, but could be a 
negative trend, or at minimum, one that could become a liability in the not so distant 
future. Let me try to explain this thesis. 
 
Making Room for a Prosperous China 
 Sino-US relations are broadening and strengthening on a cultural level, and are 
likely to continue to do so, despite fluctuations in PRC-USA relations at the 
governmental level. This is not often appreciated in East Asia, where the views of a 
powerful subculture (“the Beltway”) exert a disproportionate influence on the image of 
how Americans see China. 
 There is a general recognition among “average Americans” that China is the 
world’s superpower-in-waiting, and that already China’s economic growth (and ability to 
buy US debt) is a pillar on which global economic stability depends.1 Especially in light 
of America’s costly and unsuccessful embroilments in Afghanistan and Iraq, most 
Americans would prefer that Washington and Beijing can get along, and that East Asia, in 
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contrast to the Middle East and Central/ South Asia, is a haven of stability and prosperity.  
 Americans for the most part do not feel threatened by Chinese culture, values or 
ideology.2 Especially among young people (as I have discovered through teaching in the 
US), the iconic image of the PRC is now the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics 
in the Bird's Nest rather than the “tank-man” blocking PLA troops in June 1989. A telling 
indicator of this trend is the increasing enrollments in Mandarin Chinese, in a nation 
known for its lack of interest in foreign languages. More and more American parents 
consider knowledge of China and Mandarin essential parts of learning to succeed in the 
21st century.  
 Cultural attitudes toward a rising China on “Main Street” are generally speaking 
more positive than on “K Street.” Recent empirical work by Benjamin Page and Tao Xie 
shows that Americans have “overwhelmingly favorable” views toward Chinese culture.3 
The Chinese government is actively, and fairly effectively, promoting this trend. The 
Beijing Olympics is a good case study in how this positive image is being promoted and 
embraced.  
 The ultimate PR success of the Olympics is astonishing considering just how bad 
things were in the first half of 2008, with the uprising in Tibet and disastrous “Torch of 
Harmony” worldwide tour over the summer. Tibet issues resonate strongly in the United 
States, where the Dalai Lama enjoys a kind of “rock star” status. Riot police in Lhasa 
threatened to revive the Tiananmen Massacre image of China. Then the Olympic Torch 
burned its way across the planet, drawing contentious demonstrations in Paris, San 
Francisco, Seoul, with human rights and pro-Tibet crowds clashing against Chinese 
patriots. I was in Seoul at the time, and remember TV news showing Chinese in Seoul 
screaming down protestors, and hearing the indignation of many Koreans at the fact that 
pro-Beijing demonstrators had beaten up Koreans in their own country. The long-awaited 
Beijing Olympics, the new CCP’s “coming out party,” was looking like it was heading for 
global PR disaster.  
 In the immediate lead up to the Games, there was a toxic “negative” story that 
threatened to turn the media against Beijing: journalists in the Olympic Village couldn’t 
get unfettered Internet access. After briefly toying with a conservative, knee-jerk 
response that “foreign media have to obey Chinese law,” the PRC authorities astutely 
decided to unblock Internet access for journalists, and that was the end of it. From there 
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on out, the coverage was overwhelmingly positive, feeding into and dramatizing the 
energizing image of a rising China.4  
 The Olympic opening ceremony is culturally quite interesting, and relevant to 
our topic. The ceremony created the fiction of a peacefully-rising China, rooted in its 
ancient tradition of “harmony” he 和, and today, at long last, achieving wealth, power 
and “modernity,” without threatening the world (the imagined tradition of Admiral Zheng 
He). Beijing tapped true talent—film director Zhang Yimou, pyrotechnic artist Cai 
Guoqiang, designer and architect Ai Weiwei—to show off the new China to a global 
audience. The opening ceremony was like watching yet another highly polished, 
historically uninteresting Zhang Yimou film, but it probably worked magic on hundreds 
of millions of foreign viewers—almost none of whom have seen Zhang’s early, truly 
inspired films. What a change in the relationship between art and the state in 20 years: 
from the crude white Goddess of Democracy statue in 1989 to the 100-million-dollar 
Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk of the Olympic Opening! But US coverage made no 
reference to this transformation, nor critique the authoritarian nature of the production—
no critical comparisons to North Korea’s Arirang Mass Games or Leni Riefenstahl’s 
Triumph of the Will, both of which would have been appropriate. Instead, the Olympics 
imprinted in a billion minds a positive image of China’s rise, an image those minds were 
predisposed to accept.  
 China’s soft power campaign, with neo-traditionalist overtones manifest in the 
Olympics opening ceremony, continues in many forms. Confucius Institutes are sprouting 
up around the world, and across the US (about 70 at present). They are well funded and 
well run. I taught at Brown University in Rhode Island, and discovered that the smallest 
state in the USA (population 1 million) claims two Confucius Institutes. I attended sold-
out lectures by historian Jonathan Spence and China watcher Orville Schell in the 
auditorium of Bryant University. In the front row on both occasions sat a PRC diplomatic 
team. (It made me wonder how the two Thomas Jefferson Institutes in Hainan Province 
are doing by comparison.)  
 Another PRC state-funded soft power program called Confucius Classrooms 
targets grade school children. Confucius Classrooms are growing in pilot states 
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Minnesota (with 12) and North Carolina (with 45). The University of Chicago’s 
Confucius Institute coordinates a network of 43 Confucius Classrooms that reaches over 
12,000 students. Asia Society is building a network of Confucius Classrooms in 100 
schools across the country. Chinese language programs are growing in K-12 (Asia 
Society estimates a 200% increase from 2004 to 2008) and expanding rapidly at the 
university level.5 On my daily subway ride from Brooklyn to Manhattan, I’d see grade-
school kids as un-Chinese-looking as me wearing “bilingual” shuangwen 双文 school 
uniform T-shirts, hoping off the F train in Chinatown for class.  
 We are also just beginning to see the manifestations of the USD $6.58 billion 
“overseas propaganda initiative” waixuan gongzuo 外宣工作 sponsored by the Chinese 
government, to be carried out through Xinhua, China Daily and CCTV. In New York, I 
noticed the increase in requests for TV interviews in English by Chinese news crews, 
staffed by impressive bilinguals, including Ivy league graduates; and a couple of my 
bright former students have ended up working for China Daily in Beijing. Chinese media 
outlets are slowly becoming integrated into the global news discourse, on par with BBC 
and CNN, and climbing out of the ghetto of Chinese propaganda organs (even though 
freedom of the press is much less assured in China than the US or Europe). 
 
Still Skeptical Toward a Powerful China 
 What significance do these broader cultural trends and media shifts have on the 
realm of “high politics” and government relations? For this, it worth a quick survey of 
developments in the brief Obama-Hu era. 
 The liberal Democrats who came into power with President Obama hoped to 
craft a China-friendly foreign policy, and there was a great deal of positive energy, 
optimism even, about “G2” and “a new chapter in Sino-US relations” in 2008 and 2009. 
It became a platitude among China folks to discuss how great it was that there was 
virtually no China bashing during the US presidential campaign. With the Obama-Clinton 
team in place, think tankers went to work on grand plans for US-China cooperation on 
climate change. The Center on US-China Relations at Asia Society was among this group, 
and received Secretary Clinton’s blessing in her person during her first major policy 
speech, at Asia Society, on her way for her first overseas trip, to Asia.  
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 Of course, things didn’t pan out as the Sino-US collaborationists hoped. Obama’s 
summit trip to Beijing in November was seen as a setback in the US, and Copenhagen 
was seen as a travesty, striking a nearly fatal blow to the idea of a grand new era of Sino-
US cooperation on carbon reductions. The Obama Administration, with the support of 
moderates, got tough in Copenhagen’s wake, and US-China relations went into a tailspin 
early in 2010 over arms sales to Taiwan, meeting with the Dalai Lama, and the Google 
controversy. At the government and foreign policy elite level, US-China relations remain 
unstable, and fairly tense—Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington in April for Obama’s Nuclear 
Security Summit improved the atmosphere considerably, but different responses to the 
Cheonan tragedy recently triggered another, very negative spiral.  
 However, when it comes to economics, neither Beijing nor DC wants to rock the 
boat too hard. And diplomatic vicissitudes are not playing out on a broader social-cultural 
level in the US (arguably, a broader part of the Chinese public—although not the 
majority—gets riled up about state-to-state conflicts). China remains incredibly “hot” 
among young Americans; conscientious American parents want their kids to learn some 
Mandarin; Beijing is the place of opportunity for more and more college grads; tourism to 
China continues to grow. I would wager that most Americans do not buy the argument 
that excessive Chinese willingness to purchase US T-bills caused the financial crisis; 
rather, they are impressed by China’s ability to weather the storm, and sustain high 
growth levels despite huge drops in export demand. Likewise, although China was seen 
as a spoiler to some extent in Copenhagen, most Americans are honest enough with 
themselves to recognize that China is not the bad guy behind global warming, but rather, 
we all are—certainly the US, far and away the world’s least energy efficient major 
economy.  
 Broadening cultural relations do not ensure good political relations, and many 
Americans remain wary of the political implications of China’s rise—that is to say, they 
are more comfortable with a wealthy China than a powerful one. However, the perceived 
economic benefits of and cultural curiosity toward an increasingly prosperous China 
soften the geo-political tensions that persist between the two governments. This is in 
contrast to the situation with Korea. 
 
Illusions of the Golden Age in USA-ROK Alliance 
 In surveying the cultural landscape of US-South Korea relations, it is hard to find 
such broadening. Rather, Gi-Wook Shin’s thesis on asymmetry remains the case, and 
increasingly so: for Koreans, the US and US-Korea relations are a matter of identity, and 
of broad popular concern; for Americans, South Korea and US-ROK relations are an 
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issue of policy—especially security policy—and are of interest to only a very small part 
of the population.6  
 The apparent exception proves the rule. In the US, the one source of deeper 
historical resonance about Korea is the Korean War, and the one topic of regular media 
attention is the DPRK. But the Korean War is known as the “forgotten war,” and has none 
of the cultural significance of the Vietnam War. And North Korea is brought to the 
attention of Main Street Americans within a framework of security policy—the nuclear 
threat. By contrast, the security concerns generated by China’s rise are but one of many 
“China stories” that are of interest to and followed by average Americans. 
 USA-PRC relations are now oscillating between cooperation and conflict, but 
within a broader American cultural dynamic of increasing interest in and knowledge 
about China. USA-ROK relations are increasingly close, but on the narrow base of 
security policy. This base is the familiar, and perhaps outdated, “regional security 
architecture” for East Asia—anchored in America’s “security assurances” to allies Japan, 
South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan; justified by confronting the immediate North 
Korean threat; undergirded by facing the long-term China challenge.  
 The one-dimensional significance of North Korea as “security threat” is 
unproblematic in an American context, where North Korea is an uncomplicated evil 
leftover of the Cold War, and where the North Korean threat is the rationale behind the 
USA-ROK relationship. But the situation in South Korea would seem to be less simple, 
and less stable.  
 It is not difficult, for example, to imagine a shift by a majority of South Koreans 
in views on inter-Korean relations and policy toward North Korea, away from security 
containment and prioritization of good relations with allies, back to broad-based 
engagement and prioritization of improving inter-Korean relations. Even many who 
supported President Lee Myung-bak “quid pro quo” approach did so in the hope that it 
would eventually lead back to a new era of inter-Korean integration, but on the basis of 
mutual respect. If “Vision 3000” only has the effect of increasing tension and severing 
ties, the policy may well lose broad-based support. A shift by the South Korean public 
and leadership could be sparked by unexpected developments in the North, or could one 
day simply snap under the pressure of relentless deterioration in inter-Korean relations, 
combined with steady growth in Sino-North Korean ties. 
 So, what happens if South Koreans vote in 2012 for a president with a mandate 
for a very different North Korea policy, even some kind of “Sunshine Policy II”? Or, 
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sooner than that, President Lee Myung-bak switches tracks and presses for an inter-
Korean summit? Support from the US would be essential—this is one lesson of the 
failure of the Sunshine Policy under Kim Dae-jung, who was undercut early on by 
George W. Bush, as well as Roh Moo-hyun, whose anti-Americanism was arguably self-
defeating, at least as far as improving inter-Korean relations was concerned. But the 
continuation of current trends might make policy coordination in changed circumstances 
exceptionally difficult. If the USA-ROK alliance continues to flourish only on the “hard” 
track of sanctions, counter-proliferation, military defense, and contingency planning, US 
institutional and defense interests will grow deeply vested in continuing along the hard 
track. Financial sanctions officials in Treasury; nonproliferation hawks in the National 
Security Council; China threat voices both civilian and military—these would function as 
vested interests in a hard approach, with little in the way of countervailing forces.  
 And here I return to the instructive contrast with China, where the broad-based 
process of “making room for China” diversifies the nature of the relationship, developing 
more and more points of contact, interaction, interest—leaving political leaders with 
room to maneuver in crafting China policy. Increased cultural understanding of China 
acts like a shock absorber, softening some of the ups and downs in USA-PRC relations, 
and also serves China’s long-term interests. For example, Americans have an increased 
appreciation of Mainland Chinese views on importance of cross-straits relations. China’s 
immutable desire to reunify with Taiwan is increasingly recognized—whereas Koreans’ 
fundamental yearning for reunification is increasingly called into doubt, or simply 
ignored. 
 USA-ROK relations would seem to be in a mini-golden age, when the threat 
from the North seems so clear (renunciation of Six Party Talks, satellite test, missile tests, 
nuclear tests, submarine attack), and security policy coordination between the two 
capitals is smooth. The danger is precisely that the USA-ROK alliance qua security 
alliance feels too good, which, in the absence of countervailing forces or diversifying 
elements, constricts the nature and perception of US interests in South Korea to one of 
“bulwark against North Korean nuclear proliferation.” 
